WHO BEARS THE CORPORATION
INCOME TAX?
RICHARD GOODE t
N RECENT YEARS,

more and more of those who have commented on

the corporation income tax have disclaimed knowledge of its incidence. Many discussions include a section based on the assumption
that the tax remains on corporations and their shareholders and another
section founded on the assumption that the tax is fully passed on to
consumers in higher prices. This state of uncertainty, I fear, has confused
the public and legislators and has allowed everyone to choose his own
assumption to fit his predilections or policy program.
While there has never been any consensus about the long-run effects
of the corporate tax, most economists used to agree that, generally speaking, it cannot be shifted to consumers in the short run, while the stock
of capital remains approximately constant. The recent skepticism about
short-run incidence reflects the spread among economists of doubts
previously entertained by businessmen. The traditional view has been
challenged because of doubts about the validity of the underlying assumptions regarding business behavior and price setting. At the same
time, there has been increased willingness to assume that monetary
policy will not interfere with a general rise in the price level provoked
by increases in costs or taxation.
Attempts to resolve the issue by simple empirical investigation have
been frustrated by the great complexity of the subject. Two attempts to
overcome the difficulties by use of sophisticated econometric methods
were reported in 1963. A study by Professors Marian Krzyzaniak and
Richard A. Musgrave found the evidence consistent with full shifting,
or more than full shifting, of the corporation income tax in the short
run. On the other hand, Professor Challis A. Hall, Jr., considered that,
on plausible assumptions regarding the nature of technological progress,
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zero shifting was more probable than full shifting.' In this paper I do
not propose to review the Hall study, but I shall comment on the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave study since its methodology is more elaborate and its
conclusions more novel. Before taking up the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave study,
I shall give a brief statement of the assumptions underlying opposing
hypotheses with respect to short-run shifting. The paper concludes with
some comments on long-run shifting.
SHORT-RUN SHIFTING

The traditional conclusion that a tax on net profits does not affect
prices in the short run rests on a simple proposition. If firms are maximizing their profits before the tax is imposed, or are attempting to do
so, the tax gives them no reason to change their prices. Maximum profits
will be attained by setting price and output at the point at which the
cost of producing and selling a small addition to output equals the
additional revenue obtained (when marginal cost equals marginal
revenue). The price and output that will yield maximum profits before
the tax is levied will yield maximum profits after the tax is in effect;
any increase in price by a firm operating at its optimum point will reduce
profits before tax and will leave it with smaller after-tax profits than it
would obtain at the old price. Certain qualifications of the no-shifting
conclusion have usually been conceded but have ordinarily been regarded
as fairly minor exceptions to the general rule. 2
The hypothesis that short-run shifting of a profits tax is general,
rather than exceptional, implies that firms usually set prices below the
point that would yield maximum profits and that an increase in the
tax stimulates them to exercise their unexploited market power. This
must be true because if prices, costs, and output had already been in
the most-profitable relationship, a price increase intended to recoup
the tax would be unsuccessful and indeed would depress profits. The
shifting hypothesis, therefore, goes beyond a common criticism of price
theory which holds that firms set prices by rule of thumb and try to
earn a target rate of return. 3 Conventional behavior of that kind might
1 KRZYZANIAK & MUScRAvE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963)
[hereinafter cited as K & M]; Hall, Direct Shifting of the CorporationIncome Tax in
Manufacturing,54 AM. ECON. REv. 258 (1964) (Papers and Proceedings). This paper was
presented at the December 1963 meeting of the American Economic Association.
2 K 9- M 1-8; GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX 44-54 (1951); Brown, The
CorporateIncome Tax in the Short Run, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 240-41 (1954).
3 KAPLAN, DIRLAm & LANZILLOTTI, PRICING IN BIG BUSINESS, A CASE APPROACH (1958);
Gordon, Short-Period Price Determination in Theory and Practice, 38 AM. ECON. REv.
265 (1948); Lanzillotti, Pricing Objectives in Large Companies, 48 Ass. ECON. REV. 921
(1958).
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equally well result in prices higher than those that would yield maximum
profits.
According to orthodox theory, there are vital differences between an
increase in profits tax rates and increases in excise taxes or wage rates
and raw-material prices. Whereas the latter raise marginal variable costs
and thus ordinarily push up the equilibrium price, the profits tax does
not directly affect the elements that are supposed to enter into the calculation of the optimum price in the short run. Furthermore, the increase
in variable costs affects all producers more or less equally whereas the
profits tax per unit of output varies widely among producers according
to their individual profitability. The usual view has been that highly
profitable firms will be deterred from raising prices, in an effort to recoup
the corporate tax, by the threat of loss of business to less-profitable
competitors. The shifting hypothesis stresses the price-leadership role
of large oligopolistic firms.
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave's Econometric Analysis
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (hereinafter abbreviated, K &cM) employ
an econometric analysis designed to isolate the influence of the corporation income tax by statistically allowing for nontax factors (or holding
constant the nontax factors). Their technique is to attempt to explain
short-run changes in the before-tax rate of return on capital in manufacturing corporations by an econometric model that includes the corporate tax as one independent variable.
K & M's standard model includes, in addition to the corporate tax,
three other variables that are supposed to account for changes in the
rate of return on invested capital of manufacturing corporations: (1) the
change in the ratio of consumption expenditures to gross national
product (GNP); (2) the ratio of inventory to sales for all manufacturing
establishments; and () the ratio of accruals of all federal, state, and local
taxes other than the corporate income tax (minus government transfer
payments) to GNP. The first two of these three variables are lagged one
year.
K Sc M find that the corporate tax was more than 100 per cent shifted
in the period 1935-42, 1948-59. Their results for their so-called "standard
model" indicate that the degree of shifting was 134 per cent, and many of
their other results are close to this figure.4 These startling findings imply
that the short-run effect of an increase in the corporate tax is to raise
after-tax profits rather than to depress them.
I propose to consider the K 8cM model from the point of view of its
implications concerning the nature of consumer demand and monetary
4

K & M 45.
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conditions, the variables included and excluded, and the plausibility of
the estimates of rates of return and tax shifting.
Implications for Demand and Monetary Conditions. K 8CM's findings
imply that consumers are willing and able to spend more in the aggregate
for manufactured goods whenever prices are raised because of an increase in the corporate tax. Furthermore, K & M do not suggest that
additional expenditures for manufactures are offset by reductions in
other outlays. Hence, aggregate money expenditures must rise, and it
seems that the ratio of consumption expenditures to disposable income of
consumers will have to rise, despite a decrease in the real value of cash
balances and other fixed claims. The monetary authorities are assumed
to allow any expansion that may be needed to support higher prices.
All this seems to imply that-within the broad range of conditions
covered by the K & M study-there were virtually no market or monetary
limitations on the extent to which firms could raise prices. They could
have obtained huge increases in profits, in the absence of any change in
taxes, if they had acted in informal concert. Nor do K & M suggest that
if corporate tax rates had been raised more or had been increased more
quickly, shifting would have been less complete. Prices of manufactured
goods appear to rotate on an axis that has no visible connection with a
solid base.
Variables. Among the independent variables selected by K Se M to
explain corporate profits, the ratio of inventory to sales has some appeal,
but, on economic grounds, the one-year lag is curious. The relevance of
the change in the ratio of consumption to GNP escapes me. A rise in
this ratio, for example, might be due to causes as diverse as a reduction
in private investment or a cut in personal taxes. Also obscure is the
reason why the average effective rate of all taxes other than the federal
corporation income tax-measured by the ratio of tax accruals to GNP
-should affect profits. Should a high rate for other taxes raise or depress
profits? A positive influence might be rationalized on the grounds that
rising taxation has accompanied increases of government expenditures,
which are expansionary even when financed by taxation. A negative influence might be taken as an indication that, given the level of government expenditures, a tax increase is deflationary. K &cM find the influence to be negative but do not explain why this should be true.
Variables omitted from K &M's standard model that might be expected
to help account for short-run variations in profits include measures of
pressure on economic resources, the rate of utilization of manufacturing
capacity, the rate of change in manufacturing production or sales, the
level and rate of change of government expenditures, and the relation
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between prices and labor costs, as determined by productivity and wage
rates.
Although they did not succeed in statistically isolating this effect,
K Se M agree that an increase in government expenditures probably is
favorable to profits and concede that the rise in the before-tax rate of
return on capital "reflects tax shifting in the sense of administered price
adjustments, as well as responses to changes in government expenditures." 5 This is a highly important point, especially since the rise in
government expenditures after the mid-1930's was intimately associated
with the growth of money income and real output, which was conducive
to better profits. K k M, to be sure, argue that the statistical results
"suggest" that the tax factor is "much stronger" than the governmentexpenditures ratio as an influence on profits. However, I am most
reluctant to rest such a judgment on the statistical evidence presented
by the authors.
Plausibility of Estimates. Some information bearing on the plausibility
of the K Sc M estimates is brought together in Table I. Line I shows the
actual before-tax rate of return on capital of manufacturing corporations
in 1936-1939 and 1955-1957. (The rate of return shown is the percentage
ratio of profits plus interest paid to equity plus debt.) Line 2 gives the
rate of return as estimated from the K & M econometric model and
indicates that the equation yields a close approximation to the actual
figures. 6

The analytical question is whether the large increase in the average
TABLE I
BEFORE-TAX RATE OF RErURN ON TOTAL CAPITAL OF MANUFAcTuRING CORPORATIONS:
ACTUAL AND ALTERNATIVE STATISTICAL ESTIMATEs, 1936-1939 AND
1955-1957a (IN Pm CENT)
DESCRIPTION

1. Actual
Estimated by K & M econometric modelb
2. With actual tax rates
3. With constant 1936-1939 tax rates
4. With constant 1955-1957 tax rates

1936-1939

1955-1957

7.46

16.15

7.55
7.55
16.66

16.33
7.21
16.33

a Arithmetic means of annual percentages. Data on rates of return and tax rates are
from K & M 74. The before-tax rate of return is the sum of profits and interest paid as a
percentage of equity plus debt at the beginning of the year.
b Standard model, "naive least squares" technique, pp. 44-45, as recomputed by
Richard E. Slitor and Richard Goode.
5 K & M 47.
6 K & M consider the particular version of their model that is used in Table I less
satisfactory than another version; however, I have chosen the so-called "naive least
squares" approach because it is simpler than the preferred instrumental-variable
technique. The measures of shifting obtained by the two techniques do not differ much.
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rate of return between 1936-1939 and 1955-1957 was associated with the
increase in corporate taxes or with other factors. Lines 3 and 4 of Table I
were derived by substituting in the K & M equation two sets of constant
tax rates to replace the actual tax rates of the periods under examination.
Line 3 shows that, according to the K & M model, the rate of return in
1955-1957 would have been less than half as high as it actually was if
corporate tax rates had remained at the 1936-1939 level. Line 4 indicates
that the rate of return in 1936-1939 would have been more than twice
as high as it was if corporate tax rates in that period had already been
at their postwar level. With constant tax rates, the estimated rate of
return on capital is roughly the same in the prewar and postwar years.
In other words, the K &cM statistical analysis implies that the net influence of all the nontax factors, taken together, was approximately the
same in 1936-1939 and 1955-1957.
I consider the estimates shown in lines 3 and 4 of Table I implausible.
It seems unlikely that, except for differences in corporate tax rates,
profits would have been substantially the same in 1936-1939 and in
1955-1957, in view of differences between the two periods with respect
to unemployment rates, the apparent intensity of use of plant and
equipment, price developments, and other factors that are widely regarded as influencing profits.
The K & M econometric model (preferred version) shows almost the
same degree of shifting of the corporate tax as is suggested by simple
computations on the basis of changes in the tax rate between 1936-1939
and 1955-1957, without allowance for nontax factors. Thus, for all manufacturing corporations, the percentages of shifting estimated by the two
7
methods are as follows:

TABLE II
SHIFTING MEASURE

Equity capital base
Total capital base
Equity capital, with
correction for inflation

CRUDE

METHOD

EcoNOMRImc

136
134

123
134

99

101

METHOD

The remarkable correspondence between the estimates derived by the

two methods leaves me more worried than reassured.
The fact is, of course, that measured rates of return on corporate
capital tended to rise simultaneously with the increase in production,
the reduction in idle capacity, the growth of government expenditures,
7 The crude method is a comparison of before-tax rates of return in 1936-1939 with
those in 1955-1957; the econometric model is Model A, 1935-1942, 1948-1959. K 8: M 64.
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and general inflationary pressures after the mid-1930's. Corporate tax
rates also rose during World War II, were cut after the war, were increased during the Korean War, and then were cut again but not to the
1936-1939 level. Except in the years immediately after World War II,
the movement of tax rates was roughly coincident with that of forces
which would have tended to raise or depress profits in the absence of
short-run shifting. The forces that raised profits after 1939 also pushed
up wage rates. Perhaps an ingenious person, following the lead of K Sc M,
could construct a model that would indicate that the increase in individual income taxes payable by wage earners was fully shifted.
Conclusions with Respect to Short Run
My conclusion is that the case for short-run shifting of a large fraction
of the corporation income tax remains unproved. My own inclination is
to continue to employ the working hypothesis that little short-run shifting occurs and that, with a given capital stock, changes in the corporate
tax rate affect mainly profits. In brief the K &-M statistical analysis does
not persuade me that short-run shifting occurs on a large scale. I do not
think that K & M have succeeded in isolating the tax variable from the
other, and in my judgment more important, factors that influence profits.
My hypothesis is that short-run changes in corporate profits reflect
mainly changes in the economic environment, particularly the rate of
capacity utilization and the degree of inflationary pressures. The level
and rate of change of government expenditures contribute importantly
to capacity utilization and inflationary or deflationary pressures and are
also associated with statutory and effective corporate tax rates.
LONG-RUN

SHIFTING

The absence of short-run shifting of the corporate tax would not
mean that long-range shifting could not occur. Indeed, the traditional
view is that long-run shifting may occur because short-run shifting does
not. In the absence of short-run shifting the immediate impact of the tax
will tend to reduce rates of return on corporate equity. This may divert
capital from corporate equity to other investments, and it may retard
total capital formation. Tax shifting will result to the extent that the
scarcity of corporate equity capital drives up the before-tax rate of return
on it. The degree of shifting will depend, inter alia, on the feasibility of
reallocating capital between corporate equity and other investments and
the sensitivity of investment as a whole to the rate of return.
Statistics compiled from accounting statements show that the beforetax rate of return on corporate equity capital has been much higher in
prosperous years after World War II than in the 1920's, when tax rates
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were lower. For manufacturing corporations, profits rose enough between
1927-1929 and 1955-1957 to allow an increase in the after-tax return,
despite much higher tax rates (Table III). These two periods appear to
have comprised years of comparable utilization of resources. With the
slowing down of activity in 1958-1960, profit rates declined but still
remained above the level of the late 1920's.
At face value, the rate-of-return statistics appear to be consistent with
a large amount of shifting of the corporate tax. On the other hand, statistics on the profits share of income originating in manufacturing corporations indicate only a small change between 1927-1929 and 1955-1957
(Table III). While these statistics do not necessarily contradict those on
the rate of return, they suggest that any tax shifting that occurred took
place by economizing on the use of capital rather than through a simple
markup of prices or a reduction of wages, which would have increased
the profits share in income produced.
There is independent evidence of a long-term decline in the capital
intensity of manufacturing, as measured by the ratio of the value of
capital to output. This decline began between 1919 and 1929. The
capital-output ratio fell from 1.02 in 1919 to 0.88 in 1929 to 0.59 in 1953. 8
This change could be partly due to a capital shortage created by high
corporate tax rates; however, it is significant that the decline in the ratio
began in a period of low taxes. Changes in technology, communications,
transportation, and business methods may have played important roles.
Part of the apparent increase in the rate of return on invested capital
may be due to the failure of book value to reflect true value in an inflationary period and to changes in depredation methods and other accounting conventions. Uncertainties are also introduced by the valuation
of intangibles and changes in the degree of consolidation of balance sheets
and income statements. It is extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible,
to correct for all these items. A rough adjustment can be made by relating
profits of manufacturing corporations to the value of reproducible tangible capital (structures, equipment, and inventory) of these corporations,
with both items valued in constant prices. For this purpose, I used
estimates of net capital stocks and profits by the Office of Business Economics of the U. S. Department of Commerce. The capital-stock figures
were available in constant 1954 prices and had been derived on the basis
of constant depreciation methods. I converted profits to 1954 prices by
deflating by an implicit price index for plant and equipment in manufacturing. On this basis, it appears that the before-tax rate of return on
reproducible tangible capital increased from 15.2 per cent in 1929 to
&

S Measured in constant 1929 prices. See CREAMER, DOBROVOLSKY BORENSTEIN,
IN MANUFAcrURING AND MINING: ITS FORMATION AND FINANCING 40 (1960).
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18.3 per cent in 1955-1957, which is a much smaller increase than that
shown by unadjusted figures such as those included in Table III.
TABLE III
PROFITS IN RELATION TO BOOK VALUE OF EQurrY CAPITAL AND NATIONAL INCOME

PRODUCED: MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, SELECTED YEARS, 1927-1960a (IN PER CENT)

ITEM
Return on equityb
Before tax
After tax
Share in national
income producede
Profits before tax
Gross cash flowd
Memo: Statutory corporation
income tax ratee

1927-1929

1936-1939

1955-1957

1958-1960

8.8
7.8

7.8
6.4

18.2
9.1

13.8
6.8

22.4
28.9

19.4
26.0

24.5
30.1

20.4
27.0

12.2

17.0

52.0

52.0

a Arithmetic means of annual percentages.
b Based on data compiled from federal tax returns. See Internal Revenue Service,
U.S. Treasury Dep't, STATISTICS OF INCOME, annual volumes for 1927-1929, 1960; for
other years, see K & M 73. Equity capital is taken as the arithmetic mean of the values
for the end of the current year and the end of the preceding year. For 1927-1929, the
return on equity capital is represented by compiled net profits; for other years, by net
income.
c Percentage of national income originating in manufacturing corporations. Based
on estimates of Office of Business Economics, U.S. Department of Commerce, and
supplementary estimates.
d Profits before tax plus depredation allowances.
e Statutory rate of federal corporation income tax applicable to large firms.

The adjusted figures are not intended to eliminate the influence of
inflation but to produce a truer picture of actual profits experience,
leaving in profits the real gain realized by equity investors in an inflationary period. This real gain is due to the lag of certain contractual
costs and to a reduction in the real value of debt and interest payments.
One reason for expecting true profit rates to be higher in the mid-1950's
than in the late 1920's is that the later period was one of rising prices
whereas prices were falling in the 1920's. In 1929, wholesale prices of
nonfarm products were 29 per cent lower than they had been ten years
earlier; in 1957, they were 32 per cent higher than in 1947.10 These price
movements were attributable to broad developments with respect to
liquidity, aggregate income, and productive capacity.
Another nontax factor that may have contributed to higher profit rates
9 Derived from OFFICE OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL
INCOME (1954); OFFICE OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INCOME

AND OUTPUT (1958); OFFICE OF BUSINESS ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS (July 1962); Id. (July 1968).
10 Bureau of Labor Statistics index of wholesale prices of all commodities other than
farm products and foods. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HISrOICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 117 (1960).
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in the 1950's than in the 1920's is a change in the composition of physical
capital. Whereas structures represented 49 per cent of the total value of
reproducible tangible capital in manufacturing in 1928-1929, they accounted'for only 31.5 per cent at the end of 1957 (values in constant 1954
prices)." If the typical or required rate of return is higher for structures
than for equipment and inventories, the change in the capital mix helps
explain the rise in the over-all rate of return. While direct evidence is
not available, it seems plausible to suppose that the rate of return on
equipment and inventories should be higher than that on buildings
because buildings usually have more alternative uses than equipment
and can be more easily and cheaply financed by mortgage credit.
While I cannot pretend that these remarks offer a satisfactory explanation of profit behavior, I believe that they suggest reasons for expecting
higher rate of return on capital in prosperous years of the 1950's than
in the 1920's, regardless of the corporate tax rate.
Conclusions with Respect to Long Run
I am left uncertain about the degree of long-run shifting of the corporation income tax. On deductive grounds, I believe that the tax
causes some reallocation of capital, which tends to cushion its impact on
the return on corporate equity while depressing rates of return elsewhere.
This is a kind of long-run shifting, but it does not necessarily indicate
that capitalists as a group succeed in throwing off the tax. That is a more
doubtful proposition. I do not think that either deductive considerations
or the available statistics suggest anything dose to full shifting in the
latter sense. However, so many influences are at work that extreme
caution in drawing conclusions is wise.
Perhaps the narrow question of shifting is unanswerable because we
cannot conceptually or statistically hold constant all the relevant variables
except corporate tax rates. Powerful political forces are at work to raise
profits tax rates at the same time that economic conditions are conducive
to rising profits. Would anyone contend that corporate tax rates would
have risen so sharply in the 1940's except for the war and accompanying
conditions that were very favorable to profits? And going a step farther,
is it likely that corporate tax rates would have remained at high levels
so long if the postwar economic environment had offered no better profit
opportunities than those of the late 1930's? At the same time, high tax
rates may contribute to conditions that make for high profits because of
long-run shifting or because the revenue yield relaxes political restraints
on government spending.
11

OFFICE OF BusiNEss ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMInIRCE, U.S. INCOME AND OUTPUT

196 (1958); OFFICE OF BUSINESS
CURRENT BusiNEss 26 (July 1962).
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